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Abstract: In this paper, we present a model of finitely repeated games in which
players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity. In each round of a finite rep-
etition of a finite stage-game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, players
can employ objectively ambiguous actions by using imprecise probabilistic devices such
as Ellsberg urns to conceal their intentions. We find that adding an infinitesimal level
of ambiguity can be enough to approximate collusive payoffs via subgame perfect equi-
librium strategies of the finitely repeated game. Our main theorem states that if each
player has many continuation equilibrium payoffs in ambiguous actions, any feasible pay-
off vector of the original stage-game that dominates the mixed strategy maxmin payoff
vector is (ex-ante and ex-post) approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies of the finitely repeated game with discounting. Our condition is also necessary.
Key words: Objective Ambiguity, Ambiguity Aversion, Finitely Repeated Games,
Subgame Perfect Equilibrium, Ellsberg Urns, Ellsberg Strategies.
JEL classification: C72, C73, D81
1 Introduction
Contrary to the predictions of early models of repeated games with complete informa-
tion and perfect monitoring which state that any finite repetition of a stage-game with a
unique Nash equilibrium admits a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium payoff (see
Benoit and Krishna (1984), Gossner (1995), Smith (1995)), the experimental evidence
suggests at least a partial level of cooperation (see Kruse et al. (1994) and Sibly and
Tisdell (2017)). This paper presents a new model of finitely repeated games with com-
plete information and perfect monitoring that allows for an explanation of the birth of
cooperation in a larger class of normal form games. This class includes some stage-games
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with a unique Nash equilibrium.
The inconsistency of the predictions of the classic model of finitely repeated games
with complete information and perfect monitoring with empirical evidence is subject to
an extensive discussion and has led game theorists to relax their assumptions on the
information structure available to players (see Kreps et al. (1982) and Kreps and Wilson
(1982)), the perfection of the monitoring technology (see Abreu et al. (1990), Aumann
et al. (1995)) and players’ rationality (see Neyman (1985), Aumann and Sorin (1989)).
However, the type of actions available to players also matters.
How well do pure and mixed actions capture the intentions of players involved in a
dynamic game?
Greenberg (2000) argues that in a dynamic game, a player might want to exercise
her right to remain silent. In the rock-paper-scissors game, a player might want to play
”rock” with probability 0. These intentions are not captured by a pure or a mixed action,
but rather by a set of lotteries over the set of the player’s actions.
The strategies used in the proofs of the folk theorems to sustain equilibrium pay-
offs involve some punishment phases in which potential deviators are punished. In such
phases, the player being punished responds to the punishment scheme settled by her
fellow players, which is usually a minimax profile. In daily life, it is not always clear how
precise a player would be when specifying what she intends to do in the event that her
fellow player deviates from an agreement. An illustration of this situation can be found
in incomplete contracts in which participants agree on the collusive paths to follow but
are silent (totally ambiguous) about the enforcing mechanisms. In such cases, players
might think that the deviator herself might be immune to the punishment scheme if she
is aware of it in advance. Such behavior is not well-captured by pure or mixed strategies
of the classic models of repeated games.
This paper presents a model of finitely repeated games with complete information
and perfect monitoring in which players are allowed to use objectively ambiguous ac-
tions. In each period of the repeated game, in addition to the classic pure and mixed
actions, players can employ objectively ambiguous actions by concealing their intentions
in imprecise probabilistic devices, such as Ellsberg urns. I follow the work of Riedel
and Sass (2014) and Riedel (2017) in referring to such imprecise action as an Ellsberg
action. An Ellsberg action of a player can be thought of as a compact and convex set
of probability distributions over the set of pure actions of that player. As in the related
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literature on ambiguity in games (see Riedel and Sass (2014), Riedel (2017), Greenberg
(2000), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Ellsberg (1961)), I assume that players are
ambiguity-averse and aim to maximize the worst payoff they expect to receive.
The main finding of this paper is that our model of finitely repeated games can explain
the birth of cooperation where the classic model with pure and mixed strategies fails to
do so. We provide an example game to illustrate the idea that adding an infinitesimal
level of ambiguity can be enough to approximate collusive payoffs via subgame perfect
equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game. The main theorem states that if
each player has many continuation equilibrium payoffs in Ellsberg actions, any feasi-
ble payoff vector that dominates the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff vector is
(ex-ante and ex-post) approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies
of the finitely repeated game with discounting. The existence of multiple continuation
equilibrium payoffs in Ellsberg actions for each player is also a necessary condition for
cooperation to arise in the finite horizon.
Earlier models of finitely repeated games assumed that players could employ only
pure or mixed actions. Benoit and Krishna (1984), Benoit and Krishna (1987), and
Smith (1995) provided conditions on the stage game that ensures that the set of equi-
librium payoffs of the finitely repeated game includes any feasible payoff that dominates
the minimax payoff vector. Gossner (1995) analyzed finitely repeated games in which
players are allowed to use mixed actions, but do randomize privately.
Kreps et al. (1982) analyzed finite repetitions of the prisoners’ dilemma and showed
that the incompleteness of the information on players’ options could generate a signif-
icant level of cooperation, and Kreps and Wilson (1982) showed that adding a small
amount of incomplete information about players’ payoffs could give rise to a reputation
effect and therefore allow the monopolist to earn a relatively high payoff in finite repe-
titions of the Selten’s chain-store game.
Neyman (1985) proved that in presence of complete information and perfect monitor-
ing, utility-maximizing players can achieve cooperative payoffs in finite repetitions of the
prisoners’ dilemma given that there is a bound on the complexity of strategies available
to them. Aumann and Sorin (1989) studied two-person games with common interests
and demonstrated that if each player ascribes a positive probability to the event that
her fellow player has a bounded recall, cooperative outcomes can be approximated by
pure strategy equilibria.
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Mailath et al. (2002) studied examples of finitely repeated games with imperfect
public monitoring and illustrated that less informative signals about players’ actions can
allow for approximate Pareto superior payoffs by means of perfect equilibria of the re-
peated game, even if the stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium payoff. Sekiguchi
(2002) studied the imperfect private monitoring case and provided a characterization of
the stage-game whose finite repetitions admit non-trivial equilibrium outcomes.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents an example of a
game in which the classic model of finitely repeated games with pure and mixed strategies
can not explain the birth of cooperation while the introduction of an infinitesimal level of
ambiguity in the model allows for sustaining cooperation. Section 3 presents the model
as well as some preliminary results. The main theorem of the paper is presented and
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 provides the proofs.
2 The benefit of the ambiguity
Allowing players to play Ellsberg actions make the set of stage-game action profiles larger
and less tractable. However, this can allow to explain the birth of cooperation when the
classic model of finitely repeated games with pure and mixed actions fails to do so. In
this section, we use a three-player normal form game to illustrate that adding an in-
finitesimal level of ambiguity to the model of finitely repeated game can allow to explain
the birth of cooperation in finite time horizon.
Consider the three-player normal form game G whose payoff matrix is given by table
1 in which player 1 chooses the columns (L1, RH1 or RT1), player 2 chooses the rows (H2
or T2) and player 3 chooses the matrix (L3 or R3). In this game, the strategy L1 of player
1 is strictly dominated and therefore player 1 will play L1 with probability 0 at any Nash
equilibrium. Given that player 1 plays L1 with probability 0, player 3 will find it strictly
dominant to play R3 with probability 1. The resulting restricted game is the well known
2× 2 matching pennies game played by players 1 and 2, game that has a unique mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium profile where player 1 plays RH1 and RT1 each with probabil-
ity 1
2
and player 2 plays H2 and T2 each with probability
1
2
. Consequently, the game G
has a unique Nash equilibrium profile s∗ =
({1
2
RH1 ⊕ 12RT1}, {12H2 ⊕ 12T2}, {R3}
)
where
player 1 plays L1 with probability 0 and plays RH1 and RT1 with the same probability
1
2
, player 2 plays H2 and T2 with the same probability
1
2
and player 3 plays R3 with
probability 1.
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L1 RH1 RT1
H2 -2 -2 4 6 6 0 6 6 0
T2 -2 -2 4 6 6 0 6 6 0
L1 RH1 RT1
H2 -2 -2 4 -1 1 1 1 -1 1
T2 -2 -2 4 1 -1 2 -1 1 2
L3 R3
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the stage-game G.
As the game G has a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategy, any finite repetition
of G in which players are allowed to employ only pure and mixed actions admits a
unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff which is u(s∗) = (0, 0, 3
2
) (see Benoit and
Krishna (1984)). Now assume that players are ambiguity averse and are allowed to use
sophisticated devices as Ellsberg urns to conceal their intentions. For all ε1, ε2 ∈ [0, 12 ],
let
s(ε1, ε2) =
({1
2
RH1 ⊕ 12RT1}, {pH2 ⊕ (1− p)T2, 12 − ε1 ≤ p ≤ 12 + ε2}, {R3}
)
be the profile in which player 1 plays L1 with probability 0 and RH1 and RT1 with the
same probability 1
2
, player 3 plays R3 with probability 1 while player 2 issues her action
from a device whose unique known property is that the probability to issue H2 is be-
tween 1
2
− ε1 and 12 + ε2. At any profile p =
({1
2
RH1 ⊕ 12RT1}, {pH2 ⊕ (1− p)T2}, {R3}
)
of probability distribution where 1
2
− ε1 ≤ p ≤ 12 + ε2, player 1 and player 2 receive
each 0 while player 3 receives 2 − p. At the profile s(ε1, ε2), as player 3 is ambiguity
averse and does not know the value of p, she ex-ante receives her worst expected payoff,
that is 3
2
− ε2. The ex-ante payoff to the profile s(ε1, ε2) is therefore (0, 0, 32 − ε2). Note
that at the profile s(ε1, ε2), no ambiguity averse player can profitably deviate. Indeed,
if player 1 plays L1 with probability 0, then R3 is a strictly dominant action of player
3. The expected payoff of player 2 is independent of her chosen action (possibly mixed)
if player 1 plays RH1 and RH2 with the same probability
1
2
and player 3 plays R3 with
probability 1. Furthermore, if player 3 plays R3 with probability 1 and player 2 plays
{pH2⊕ (1− p)T2, 12 − ε1 ≤ p ≤ 12 + ε2}, the worst expected payoff of player 1 is maximal
if she plays RH1 and RT1 with the same probability
1
2
.
At the equilibrium profile s(ε1, ε2), player 3 receives a payoff that is strictly less than
her mixed Nash equilibrium payoff. Therefore, in the repeated game, she is willing to
conform to a play of the pure action profile (RH1, H2, L3) if it is followed by sufficiently
many plays of the unique stage-game mixed Nash equilibrium s∗ and deviations by player
3 are punished by switching each s∗ to s(ε1, ε2). As players 1 and 2 play best responses
at the profile (RH1, H2, L3), the above described path and the associated mechanism
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constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated game. At that equilib-
rium, player 1 (as well as player 2) receives an average payoff that is strictly greater than
her expected payoff at s∗. Thus, the behavior of players 1 and 2 can also credibly be
leveraged near the end of the finitely repeated game. This allows to approximate collu-
sive payoffs via subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game. For
instance the Pareto superior payoff vector (2, 2, 2) can be approximated by the following
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the finitely repeated game.
1. For any t ∈ {0, . . . T1}, play s1 = (LH1, H2, L3) at time 2t and play s2 = (RL1, L2, L3)
at time 2t+ 1.
2. For any t ∈ {2T1 + 2, . . . , 2T1 + 3 + d 2ε1 e}, play s∗.
3. If any player deviates, play s(ε1, ε2) till the end of the game.
As we observe in this example, when the classic model of finitely repeated games where
players are allowed to employ only pure and mixed actions fail to explain the birth of co-
operation, allowing players to be objectively imprecise about the probability distribution
they intend to used to issue their actions in each round of the finitely repeated game can
allow to sustain cooperation. This observation still holds if players are allowed to used a
relatively small level of ambiguity(that is if the upper bound of the level of imprecision of
each player approaches zero). This is counter-intuitive as the set of stage-game actions
with zero noises equals the set of mixed actions and, as in our example, the classic models
of finitely repeated game with mixed actions predict no cooperation at all.
3 The Model
3.1 The stage-game
3.1.1 The initial stage-game
I represent a finite normal form game G by (N,S, u) where for all i ∈ N , Si is the set of
pure actions of player i. Both the set of players N = {1, ..., n} and the set S = ×i∈NSi
of actions are finite. The utility of player i given s = (s1, ..., sn) ∈ S is measured by
ui(s). A mixed strategy of player i ∈ N is a probability distribution pi over the set
Si. Let ∆Si be the set of mixed strategies of player i. We will abusively denote by
∆S = ∆S1× ...×∆Sn the set of profiles of mixed strategies. At the profile p = (p1, .., pn)
∈ ∆S, player i receives the expected payoff ui(p) =
∑
s∈S p(s)ui(s) where for all s ∈ S,
p(s) =
∏
i∈N pi(si), pi(si) being the probability that player i assigns to the action si
according to the distribution pi. For any p = (p1, ..., pn) ∈ ∆S, i ∈ N and p′i ∈ ∆Si,
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(p′i, p−i) denotes the strategy profile in which all players except i behave the same as in
p and the choice of i is p′i. A profile of mixed strategy p ∈ ∆S is a Nash equilibrium
of G (p ∈ Nash(G)) if for all i ∈ N and p′i ∈ ∆Si, ui(p′i, p−i) ≤ ui(p).
The payoff vector x = (x1, ..., xn) is a feasible vector of the game G if it belongs
to the convex hull of the set of payoff vectors of the game G. That is, if there exists
a sequence (λl)1≤l≤L of positive real numbers and a sequence (al)1≤l≤L of pure actions’
profile such that ΣLl=1λl = 1 and x = Σ
L
l=1λlu(a
l). For all players i, j ∈ N , player i
is equivalent to player j if there exists two real numbers βij and αij > 0 such that
ui(s) = αijuj(s) +βij for all s ∈ S. Denote by J (i) the set of players that are equivalent
to player i. Let
µi = minp∈∆S maxj∈J (i) maxp′j∈∆Sj ui(p−j, p
′
j) = ui(m
i)
be the mixed strategy effective minimax payoff3 of player i and µ = (µ1, ..., µn) be
the effective minimax payoff vector of the game G. Let
νi = maxj∈J (i) maxpj∈∆Sj minp−j∈×k 6=j∆Sk ui(p−j, pj)
be the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff of player i and ν = (ν1, ..., νn) be
the effective maxmin payoff vector of the game G. Let V ∗ be the set of feasible payoff
vectors that strictly dominates the effective maxmin payoff vector ν.
3.1.2 The Ellsberg game
To ease the presentation of our results, we consider a very simple model of Ellsberg
game and where players employ only reduced strategies. Riedel and Sass (2014) and
Riedel (2017) provide a general model.
Let G = (N,S, u) be a finite normal form game. An Ellsberg strategy Pi of player
i is a compact set of probability distributions over the set Si. Let Pi = {Pi ⊆ ∆Si |
Pi is compact} be the set of Ellsberg strategies of player i and P be the set of Ellsberg
strategy profiles. Given a profile P = (P1, ..., Pn) ∈ P , the utility of player i is given by
ui(P ) = minp∈P ui(p). The 3-tuple (N,P , u) is the Ellsberg extension of the game G.
For any P ∈ P , i ∈ N and P ′i ∈ Pi, (P ′i , P−i) denotes the Ellsberg strategy profile in
which all players except i behave the same as in P and the choice of i is P ′i . A profile of
Ellsberg strategy P ∈ P is an Ellsberg equilibrium of G (P ∈ E(G)) if for all player
i ∈ N and Ellsberg strategy P ′i ∈ Pi of player i, ui(P ′i , P−i) ≤ ui(P ).
3The effective minimax has been introduced by Wen (1994). The effective minimax payoff of a player
is her reservation value in the stage-game and equals her minimax payoff if she is not equivalent to any
other player.
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3.1.3 Priliminary results on the Ellsberg game
In the Ellsberg game, players have richer set of strategies and can even exercise their
right to remain silent (totally ambiguous). Remaining silent can be more severe than
employing a mixed strategy minimax profile. More importantly, remaining silent is an
optimal punishment strategy profile in the Ellsberg game. We have the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In the Ellsberg game, remaining silent is an optimal punishment strategy.
Proof. of Lemma 1. Let j ∈ N and P−j ∈ P−j, be an Ellsberg profile of players of the
block −j. We have P−j ⊆ ×k 6=j∆Sk and therefore
ui(×k 6=j∆Sk, Pj) ≤ ui(P−j, Pj).
This means that, in the Ellsberg game, to punish an ambiguity averse players, it is op-
timal for her opponents to remain silent.
Intuitively, if on a punishment path all punishers exercise their right to remain silent,
then, the target player, if she is ambiguity averse, will play a prudent strategy and will
ex-ante receive at most her mixed strategy maxmin payoff. To illustrate how severe
such punishment scheme can be, in comparison to the classic mixed strategy minimax,
consider the three-player game whose payoff matrix is given by Table 2.
c d
a 0 0 0 1 −1 1
b −1 1 1 0 0 −1
c d
1 1 −1 −1 1 1
1 −1 0 0 0 0
e f
Table 2: Payoff matrix of a three-player game where the use of Ellsberg strategies allow
for severe punishment schemes.
In this game, player 1 chooses the rows (a or b), player 2 chooses the columns (c or
d), and player 3 chooses the matrices (e or f). If only mixed strategies are allowed, each
player can ensure herself the payoff 0. This is not possible under ambiguity. Indeed,
under ambiguity, no player can ensure herself a payoff strictly greater than −1
2
.
Suppose that player 2 plays c, and that player 3 plays e. Player 1 best responds
playing a and receives a payoff equals 0. Moreover, given any mixed strategy profile of
players 2 and 3, player 1 receives positive payoff if she plays a mixed strategy best re-
sponse. Therefore, the mixed strategy minimax payoff of player 1 equals 0. Now suppose
that player 2 and player 3 remain silent. Then, player 1, if she is ambiguity averse, will
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play a prudent strategy. She will mix a and b with equal probability and will ex-ante
receive her mixed strategy maxmin payoff, −1
2
. Using similar argument (this game is
some how symmetric), the reader can check that the mixed strategy minimax payoff of
both players 2 and 3 equal 0 and that the mixed strategy maxmin payoff of both play-
ers 2 and 3 equals −1
2
. Thus, employing Ellsberg strategy allows to settle punishment
schemes that are more severe than classic minimax strategies.
Let
µEi = minP∈P maxj∈J (i) maxP ′j∈Pj ui(P−j, P
′
j)
be the pure effective minimax payoff of player i ∈ N in the Ellsberg game. We have the
following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let G be a finite normal form game. The pure strategy effective minimax
payoff of a player in the Ellsberg game equals her mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff
in the original game G.
Proof. of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1, we have µEi = maxj∈J (i) maxPj∈Pj ui(×k 6=j∆Sk, Pj).
Let j ∈ J (i) and pj ∈ ∆Sj. We have
ui(×k 6=j∆Sk, {pj}) ≤ maxPj∈Pj ui(×k 6=j∆Sk, Pj)
and therefore
minp−j∈×k 6=j∆Sk ui(p−j, pj) ≤ µEi .
It follows that
νi ≤ µEi .
That is, the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff of player i in the Ellsberg game
is less than or equal to her effective minimax payoff in the Ellsberg game. The effective
minimax payoff of player i in the Ellsberg game is less than or equal her mixed strategy
effective maxmin payoff as well. Indeed,
µEi = maxj∈J (i) maxPj∈Pj ui(×k 6=j∆Sk, Pj)
= maxPj∗∈Pj∗ ui(×k 6=j∗∆Sk, Pj∗)
= ui(×k 6=j∗∆Sk, P ∗j∗)
for some j∗ ∈ J (i) and P ∗j∗ ∈ Pj∗ . We have
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µEi = minp−j∗∈×k 6=j∗∆Sk,pj∗∈P ∗j∗ ui(p−j∗ , pj∗)
= minp−j∗∈×k 6=j∗∆Sk ui(p−j∗ , p
∗
j∗)
for some p∗j∗ ∈ P ∗j∗ . As p∗j∗ ∈ P ∗j∗ ⊆ ∆Sj∗ , we have
µEi ≤ maxpj∗∈∆Sj∗ minp−j∗∈×k 6=j∗∆Sk ui(p−j∗ , pj∗).
So,
µEi ≤ maxj∈J (i) maxpj∈∆Sj minp−j∈×k 6=j∆Sk ui(p−j, pj).
We conclude that µEi = νi. So, the reservation value of a player in the Ellsberg game
equals her mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff.
3.1.4 Further notations
Let G = (N,S, u) be a finite normal form game and let γ be a number that is strictly
greater than any payoff a player might receive in the game G. Let τ(G) = (N,S, u′) be
the normal form game where the payoff function u′i of player i ∈ N is equals γ if i has
distinct Ellsberg equilibrium payoff in the game G. In the case player i has a unique
Ellsberg equilibrium payoff in the game G, u′i(s) = ui(s) for all s ∈ S. For all l > 0, let
Nl be the set of players who have their payoff function equal to the constant γ in the
game τ (l)(G), where τ (l) is the l th compound of τ . Let h be minimal such that Nh is a
maximal element of the sequence {Nl}∞l=1.
Definition 1 The sequence N0 = ∅ ⊆ N1 ⊆ ... ⊆ Nh is the Ellsberg decomposition of
the game G.
Definition 2 The Ellsberg decomposition N0 = ∅ ⊆ N1 ⊆ ... ⊆ Nh is complete if
Nh = N .
3.2 The finitely repeated game
Let G be a finite normal form game which I will refer to as the stage game. Given T > 1
and δ < 1, let G(δ, T ) be the game obtained by repeating the stage game T times and
where players’ discount factor is δ. In the game G(δ, T ), in every round, each player
observes the properties of the profile of Ellberg strategies chosen (or equivalently the
properties of the randomization devices chosen by players) as well as the realized action
profile, receives her payoff as in the stage game and chooses her Ellsberg strategy for the
next period. A player may therefore condition her behavior on the history of Ellsberg
profiles used in the previous periods. Formally, a strategy of player i in the repeated
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game G(δ, T ) is a map σi : ∪Tt=1P t−1 → Pi where P0 is the empty set. Given a history
ht = (h1, .., ht−1) ∈ P t−1 = P × ... × P , the strategy σi of player i recommends to play
the Ellsberg strategy σi(h
t) at period t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T . In the repeated game G(δ, T ), the
discounted average payoff of a player given a play path (s1, ..., sT ) ∈ ST is
uδi (s
1, ..., sT ) = 1−δ
1−δT Σ
T
t=1δ
t−1ui(st).
The strategy profile σ = (σ1, ..., σn) induces a set of probability distributions P (σ)
over the set ST of play paths of length T . Players are ambiguity averse and aim to
maximize the minimal expected payoff that they could get from the set P (σ). That is,
given σ−i, player i chooses σi in order to maximize
uδi (σ−i, σi) = minp∈P (σ−i,σi)
∑
h∈ST p(h)u
δ
i (h)
where p(h) is the probability with which the history h is observed according to the
probability distribution p. The strategy profile σ is an Ellsberg equilibrium of G(δ, T ) if
for all player i, and given σ−i, the strategy σi maximizes the minimal expected payoff of
player i. The strategy profile σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of G(δ, T ) if for all
t < T and history ht ∈ St−1, the restriction σ|ht of the strategy profile σ to the observed
history ht is an Ellsberg equilibrium of the game G(δ, T − t+ 1).
Any ex-ante payoff vector to a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the finitely
repeated game with discounting dominates the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff
vector of the game G.
Lemma 3 Let G be a finite normal form game, δ < 1, T > 0, σ be a subgame perfect
equilibrium of G(δ, T ) and ν be the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff vector of the
game G. Then, uδi (σ) ≥ νi for all i ∈ N .
Indeed, playing a prudent strategy in each period of the finitely repeated game, at
least one player of a given equivalence class can guarantee to herself (and therefore to
the whole class) her effective maxmin payoff.
Lemma 4 Let G be a finite normal form game. Any payoff vector that is ex-post ap-
proachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game
with discounting dominates the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff vector of the game
G.
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This lemma says that, if players are allowed to strategically make use of objective
ambiguity, then, a necessary condition for a payoff vector to be ex-post approachable
by means of subgame perfect equilibria of the finitely repeated game is that, the latter
payoff vector dominates the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff vector of the stage
game G. Indeed, if a payoff vector is ex-post approachable by subgame perfect equilibria
of the finitely repeated game, then, it is ex-ante approachable by subgame perfect equi-
libria and thus dominates the mixed strategy maxmin payoff vector.
4 Main result and discussion
In this section I present the main finding of this paper. It is convenient to introduce 2
definitions.
Definition 3 Let G be a finite normal form game and σ be a strategy profile of the
finitely repeated game with discounting G(δ, T ). The support of P (σ) is the set of histories
h ∈ ST such that there exists a probability distribution in P (σ) that assigns a strictly
positive probability to the history h.
Definition 4 The support of a strategy profile of the finitely repeated game is the set of
possible play paths.
Definition 5 Let G be a normal form game and x a payoff vector. The payoff vector
x is ex-post approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibria of the finitely repeated
with discounting if for any ε > 0, there exists δ < 1 and T such that, for all δ ≥ δ,
T ≥ T , G(δ, T ) has a subgame perfect equilibrium profile σ such that ∥∥uδ(h)− x∥∥∞ < ε
for all play path h ∈ ST in the support of P (σ).4
A payoff vector is ex-post approachable by mean of subgame perfect equilibria of the
finitely repeated game if it can approached by subgame perfect equilibria that have the
following property. the discounted payoff to any play path within the support of the
strategy is closed enough to the given payoff vector.
4.1 Statement of the main result
Theorem 1 Let G be a finite normal form game such that V ∗ 6= ∅. The following are
equivalent.
1. G has a complete Ellsberg decomposition.
4For all payoff vector x = (x1, ..., xn), ‖x‖∞ = max1≤i≤n|xi|
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2. Any point of V ∗ is ex-post approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibria of
the finitely repeated game with discounting.
3. The set of points of V that are approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibria
of the finitely repeated with discounting has a relative interior point.
The most laborious part of the proof of Theorem 1 is to show that, under the state-
ment 1) of Theorem 1, it is possible to ex-post approach any feasible payoff vector of the
game G that dominates the mixed strategy effective maxmin payoff vector by means of
subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game. The role of State-
ment 1) here is to leverage the behavior of players in the End-game, phase of equilibrium
strategies of the finitely repeated game where essentially (recursive) equilibrium profiles
of the stage game are played, see Lemma 6 and Lemma 7. As we do not assume that the
dimension of the set of feasible payoff vectors equals the number of players, the block
J (i) might contains more than one player. It is therefore not immediate to make use
of the payoff asymmetry lemma of Abreu et al. (1994) to construct a suitable reward
phase. Lemma 7 allows to independently reward players and motivate them to be effec-
tive punisher during a punishment phase.
Moreover, as the time horizon is finite, the powerful payoff continuation lemma of Fu-
denberg and Maskin (1991) does not apply. We obtain a version of the latter lemma for
finitely repeated games with discounting which says that, for any positive ε, there exists
uniform k > 0 and δ such that, any feasible payoff is within ε of the discounted average
of a deterministic path of length k for any discount factor greater than or equal to δ, see
Lemma 5. Basically, the payoff continuation lemma for finitely repeated games provides
an uniform integer k such that, any feasible payoff vector x can be approximated by a
deterministic path of the same length k. Appending finitely many such deterministic
paths, we obtain a deterministic path pi whose discounted average is closed enough to
the payoff vector x and, at any (sufficiently) early point of time, the continuation payoff
of the path pi is closed enough to the payoff vector x.
In Section 6.1, given a feasible payoff vector of G that dominates the mixed strategies
effective maxmin payoff vector, I construct a sequence of subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies of the finitely repeated game such that, ex-post, all the possible corresponding
sequences of discounted payoff vectors converge to that target payoff vector.
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4.2 Discussion
While both necessary and sufficient, Statement 1) of Theorem 1 is weaker than Smith’s
(1995) necessary and sufficient condition. Indeed, as mixed Nash equilibria of the stage-
game are also Ellsberg equilibria, a complete Nash decomposition (see Smith (1995) for
a formal definition of Nash decomposition) induces a complete Ellsberg decomposition.
However, a complete Ellsberg decomposition does not necessarily induce a complete Nash
decomposition. The three-player game whose payoff matrix is provided in Table 1 serves
as an illustration. In that game, each player has a unique mixed Nash equilibrium payoff
but many continuation equilibrium payoffs in Ellsberg actions (see Section 2 for details).
For the game in Table 1, the classic models of finitely repeated games in which players
can employ only pure and mixed actions predict no cooperation at all. Our model pre-
dicts that any feasible payoff vector that dominates the mixed strategy effective maxmin
payoff vector is approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibria of the finitely re-
peated game with discounting. Moreover, we are able to approximate the cooperative
and Pareto superior payoff vector (2, 2, 2) by means of a simple subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the finitely repeated game. Thus, the use of imprecise probabilistic devices in the
finitely repeated game model can allow for an explanation of the birth of cooperation in
finite repetitions of a non-cooperative game where the classic models of finitely repeated
games with pure and mixed strategies fail to do so.
As the Ellsberg extension of a finite normal form game is still a normal form game, it
might appear logical to apply an existing limit perfect folk theorem [see, e.g., Benoit and
Krishna (1984)] to the Ellsberg game and obtain the set of payoff vectors that are ex-
ante approachable by means of the subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely
repeated game. The previsions of Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 of this paper are different
in the sense that they provide (under a weak condition) a characterization of the set of
payoff vectors that are ex-post (and thus ex-ante) approachable by means of subgame
perfect equilibrium strategies of the finitely repeated game. The difference between the
former and the latter sets of payoff vectors can be clearly observed in the three-player
game G, whose payoff matrix is given by Table 3.
In the Ellsberg extension Γ of the game G, each player has distinct Nash equilib-
rium payoffs and no two players have equivalent utility functions. The limit perfect
folk theorem of Benoit and Krishna (1984) states that any payoff vector that lies in
the convex hull of the set of payoff vectors of the game Γ and which dominates the pure
minimax payoff vector (−1
2
,−1
2
,−1
2
) of the game Γ is approachable by means of subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium strategies of finite repetitions of the game Γ [which is equiva-
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c d
a 0 0 0 1 −1 1
b −1 1 1 0 0 −1
c d
1 1 −1 −1 1 1
1 −1 0 0 0 0
e f
Table 3: Some Ellsberg payoff vectors are non feasible and an ex-ante approximation is
vague.
lent to being ex-ante approachable by means of subgame perfect (Ellsberg) equilibrium
strategies of finite repetitions of G]. The payoff vector (−1
3
,−1
3
,−1
3
) is therefore ex-ante
approachable by means of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of finite repetitions of
the Ellsberg game. Note that, ex-post, in each period of finite repetitions of the game
Γ, players receive payoffs as in the game G and it is not possible to implement/approach
the payoff vector (−1
3
,−1
3
,−1
3
) in the repeated game as the ex-post sum of payoffs of
players 1 and 2 is always greater than or equal 0. More importantly, the payoff vector
(−1
3
,−1
3
,−1
3
) does not belong to the set of feasible payoff vectors of the game G. In
addition, applying the existing limit perfect folk theorems to the Ellsberg game does
not guarantee that any feasible payoff vector of the game G which dominates the mixed
strategy effective maxmin payoff vector of the game G can be approached by subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium strategy of finite repetitions of the Ellsberg game and whose
ex-post payoff vector is closed enough to the target payoff vector.
5 Conclusion
This paper presented a model of finitely repeated games with complete information and
perfect monitoring in which players can strategically make use of objective ambiguity.
In addition to the classic pure and mixed actions, Ellsberg urns are available to players.
An Ellsberg urn captures the quantity of information a player might want to know and
share about her intentions. The main theorem provides a weak condition under which
any feasible payoff vector that dominates the maxmin payoff vector of the stage-game is
achievable via subgame perfect equilibria of the finitely repeated game with discounting.
This new model explains how players can sustain collusive payoff vectors for some cases
in which the classic models of finitely repeated games with pure and mixed actions fail
to explain the birth of cooperation.
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6 Appendix 4: Proofs
6.1 Sketch of the proof of Theorem 1
In this section, Given a feasible payoff vector that dominates the mixed strategy effective
maxmin payoff vector, I explain how to construct a subgame perfect equilibrium strat-
egy σ of the finitely repeated game with discounting and whose ex-post payoff vectors is
closed enough to the target payoff vector.
Let y ∈ V ∗. The construction of σ involves few ingredients. The most important
are the target path and the end-game-strategy. The target path is a finite sequence of
pure action profiles of the stage game. It is obtained by applying our Lemma 5 (payoff
continuation lemma for finitely repeated games) to the payoff vector y. The end-game-
strategy corresponds to the very last phase of the game. It is a family of subgame perfect
equilibria of the finitely repeated game. It allows to independently leverage the behavior
of players in the finitely repeated game, regardless of whether some players are equivalent
or not.
The strategy profile σ involves 5 phases. The first phase consists in some conjunction
of the target path. If a player unilaterally deviates early during this phase, the strategy
σ prescribes to start the second phase and thereafter to go to the third phase.
The second phase is a punishment phase where a potential deviator i is punished.
There is no specific requirement for players of the block N\J (i) while players of the block
J (i) have to remain silent, that is completely ambiguous. At the end of this phase, we
record in a boolean vector α, the set of players who were silent during the punishment
phase. We prove that for large discount factor, an ambiguity averse player of the block
N\J (i) will find it strictly dominant to remain silent during the punishment phase.
The third phase serves as a compensation. Indeed, it might be the case that the pun-
ishment phase is more severe than required and players of the block J (i) may receive a
negative ex-ante payoff in each period of the punishment phase. The fourth phase serves
as a transition. In the fifth phase, players are credibly rewarded.
Note that, if no deviation from σ occurs in the repeated game, players will follow
some loops of the target path and then move to the end-game-strategy. In Section 6.4 I
show that for sufficiently long time horizon and large discount factor, the strategy profile
σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the finitely repeated game and that the determin-
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istic part of the resulting discounted average payoff will be close enough to y and the
ambiguous part will goes to 0.
Now I proceed to the detailed proof of Theorem 1. To ease this proof, I introduce
three lemmata.
6.2 The payoff continuation lemma for finitely repeated games
Lemma 5 For any ε > 0, there exists k > 0 and δ < 1 such that for all x ∈ V , there
exists a deterministic sequence of stage game actions {sτ}kτ=1 whose discounted average
payoff is within ε of x for all discount factor δ ≥ δ.
Lemma 5 establishes that for any positive ε, one can construct uniform k > 0 and δ
such that, any feasible payoff is within ε of the discounted average of a deterministic path
of length k for any discount factor greater or equal δ. This lemma allow to approach any
feasible payoff vector by deterministic paths of the finitely repeated game in presence of
discount factor.
Proof. of Lemma 5. Let ε > 0 and y =
∑m
l=1 α
lu(al) ∈ V be a feasible payoff, where
al ∈ S for l = 1, ...,m. Assume that there exists m integers q1, q2, ..., qm such that for all
l = 1, ...,m, αl = ql
Q
where Q =
∑m
l=1 ql. Consider the sequences {by,p}Qp=1 and {cy,τ}∞τ=1
defined as follows.
by,p = al if and only if
∑
l′<l ql′ < p ≤
∑
l′≤l ql′
cy,τ = by,p if and only if τ − p ≡ 0[Q].
To have a clear view of the construction of the sequences {by,p}Qp=1 and {cy,τ}∞τ=1,
consider this simple example where m = 3, q1 = 2, q2 = 1, q3 = 4, Q = 7, and therefore
y = 2
7
u(a1) + 1
7
u(a2) + 4
7
u(a2). Table 4 provides the value of by,p for p = 1, ..., 7 while
Table 5 provides the value of cy,τ , τ ≥ 1.
by,p by,1 by,2 by,3 by,4 by,5 by,6 by,7
al a1 a1 a2 a3 a3 a3 a3
Table 4: Values of by,τ , τ ≥ 1
cy,τ cy,1 cy,2 cy,3 cy,4 cy,5 cy,6 cy,7 cy,8 cy,9 cy,10 cy,11 cy,12 cy,13 cy,14 ...
by,p by,1 by,2 by,3 by,4 by,5 by,6 by,7 by,1 by,2 by,3 by,4 by,5 by,6 by,7 ...
al a1 a1 a2 a3 a3 a3 a3 a1 a1 a2 a3 a3 a3 a3 ...
Table 5: Values of cy,τ , τ ≥ 1
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We can observe that the undiscounted average payoff of the sequence {cy,τ}∞τ=1 is
equal to 2
7
u(a1) + 1
7
u(a2) + 4
7
u(a2).
Going back to the general case, let l ∈ {1, ...,m}, Θ = AQ + B where A > 0 and
0 ≤ B < Q and consider
N(l, cy,Θ) = {τ | cy,τ = al}
and
β(l, cy,Θ) = 1−δ
1−δΘ
∑
τ∈N(l,cy ,Θ) δ
τ−1.
We have
1−δ
1−δΘ
∑
τ≤Θ δ
τ−1u(cy,τ ) =
∑m
l=1 β(l, c
y,Θ)u(al)
and
β(1, cy,Θ) = 1−δ
1−δΘ
[
1−δp1
1−δ
1−δAQ
1−δQ + δ
AQ 1−δp′1
1−δ
]
where p′1 = min{B, p1};
β(2, cy,Θ) = 1−δ
1−δΘ
[
δp1 1−δ
p2
1−δ
1−δAQ
1−δQ + δ
AQ+p1 1−δp
′
2
1−δ
]
where p′2 = min{max{0, B − p1}, p2};
.
.
.
β(m, cy,Θ) = 1−δ
1−δΘ
[
δp1+...+pm−1 1−δ
pm
1−δ
1−δAQ
1−δQ + δ
AQ+p1+...+pm−1 1−δp′m
1−δ
]
where p′m = min{max{0, B − p1 − ...− pm−1}, pm}.
As
limδ→1 β(l, cy,Θ) =
pl
AQ+B
AQ
Q
= pl
Q+B
A
and
limA→+∞
pl
Q+B
A
= pl
Q
,
there exists Ay > 0 such that, for all A ≥ Ay, there exists δy,A < 1 such that for all
δ > δy,A, ∥∥ 1−δ
1−δΘ
∑
τ≤Θ δ
τ−1u(cy,τ )− y∥∥ < ε
2
page 18
Ghislain-Herman DEMEZE-JOUATSA Bielefeld University
for all B, 0 ≤ B < Q. Let {B˜(y, ε
2
), y ∈ Y }5 be a finite open covering of the compact
set V where Y is the set of convex sum of stage game payoff vectors with rational
coefficients. Pose A = max{Ay, y ∈ Y }, k = Q(A+ 1) and δ = max{δy,A+1, y ∈ Y }. Let
x ∈ V and y ∈ Y such that x ∈ B˜(y, ε
2
). Take sτ = cy,τ for τ = 1, ..., k.
The next two lemmata explain how to leverage the behavior of players in the very
last phase of the game where essentially only stage game (recursive) equilibrium profile
are played.
6.3 The end-game-strategy
Lemma 6 Assume that the Ellsberg decomposition ∅ ⊆ N1 ⊆ ... ⊆ Nh of the game G is
complete. Then there exists φe > 0, T > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and for all i ∈ N , there exists σi,1
and σi,2 two strategy profiles of the T−fold repeated game such that
1. σi,1 and σi,2 are subgame perfect equilibria of the finitely repeated game G(δ, T ) for
all δ ∈ (δ, 1);
2. uδi (σ
i,1) > φe + u
δ
i (σ
i,2).
Lemma 7 Suppose that the stage-game G has a complete Ellsberg decomposition. Then
there exists φ > 0 such that for all p ≥ 0, there exists rp > 0, δ ∈ (0, 1) and a family
{θp(γ) | γ ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}} of strategy profiles of the rp−fold repeated game
such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) and γ ∈ {0, 1}n ∪ {(−1, · · · ,−1)}, θp(γ) is a subgame perfect
equilibrium of the finitely repeated game G(δ, rp). Furthermore, for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) i ∈ N
and γ, γ′ ∈ {0, 1}n we have
uδi [θ
p(1, γ−i)]− uδi [θp(0, γ−i)] ≥ φ (1)
uδi [θ
p(γ)]− uδi [θp(−1, · · · ,−1)] ≥ φ (2)
|uδi [θp(γ)]− uδi [θp(γJ (i) , γ′J\J (i))]| <
1
2p
. (3)
The proofs of Lemmata 6 and 7 are provided in a more general case in a parallel working
paper. We therefore omit them.
5B˜(y, ε2 ) = {z ∈ V | ‖z − y‖∞ < ε2}
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6.4 Proof of the Theorem 1
Proof of Theorem 1. Let G be a finite normal form game such that V ∗ 6= ∅. Let’s
shift the utility function of the game G to have the effective maxmin payoff of each player
equal to 0 and so that within the same equivalence class, players, if many, have the same
payoff function. This does not change the strategic behavior of players.
Part 1. (1⇒2). Assume that the Ellsberg decomposition of the game is complete.
Let ε > 0 and y ∈ V ∗. I wish to construct δ < 1 and T > 0, and for all δ ≥ δ and T ≥ T , a
subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile σT of G(δ, T ) such that
∥∥uδ(h)− y∥∥∞ < 3ε
for all history h in the support of P (σT ).
Apply the payoff continuation lemma (see Lemma 5) to ε and obtain k > 0, δ0 < 1,
and a deterministic path
piy = (s1, ..., sk)
such that
d(y, uδ(piy)) < ε
for all δ ∈ (δ0, 1). For all δ ∈ (δ0, 1), let
y = limδ→1 uδ(piy).
Obtain φ, r1 and θ
1 with p = 1 from the Lemma 7 and let
u1,r1 [θ1(1, · · · , 1)] = lim
δ→1
uδ[θ1(1, · · · , 1)].
Let q1 > 0 and q2 > 0 such that
0 < q1kui(∆S) + q2r1ku
1,r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] < q1k + q2r1k
2
yi for all i ∈ N
and
−2kρ+ q1k
2
yi > 0 for all i ∈ N
where
ρ = maxa∈A ‖u(a)‖∞.
Given q1, q2 and r1, choose r such that
−2(q1k + q2r1k)ρ+ rφ > 0.
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Given q1 q2, r1 and r, choose p > 0 such that
q2r1k
2
yi −
r
2p
> yi −
r
2p
> 0 for all i ∈ N.
Apply the Lemma 7 to p and obtain rp and θ
p. Update q1 ← rpq1; q2 ← rpq2; r ← rpr.
The parameters φ, θ1, q1, q2, r, r1 and θ
p are such that
−2q1kρ+ rφ > 0; (4)
yi −
r
2p
> 0; (5)
2kρ+ q1kui(∆S) + q2r1ku
1,r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] + r
2p
− (q1k + q2r1k − k)yi < 0 (6)
and
−2(q1k + q2r1k)ρ+ rφ > 0 for all i ∈ N. (7)
Let
pi = ( piy, ..., piy︸ ︷︷ ︸
C+q1+q2r1 times
)
Set α = (1, · · · , 1).
From now on, a deviation by a player from an ongoing path is called “early deviation”
if it occurs during the first Ck periods of the game. In the other case, the deviation is
called “late deviation”. Consider the strategy profile σ of the finitely repeated game
described by the following 5 phases.
P0 (Main path): At any time t, play the t th action profile of the path pi. [If player i
deviates early, start the Phase Pi; if player i deviates late, start LD. Ignore any
simultaneous deviation.] Go to Phase EG.
Pi (Punish player i): Reorder the profile of actions in each upcoming cycle of length k
of the main path according to player i′s preferences, starting from her best profile.
This phase last for q1k periods and each player of the block J (i) has to remain
silent (completely ambiguous). Each player of the block N\J (i) can play whatever
Ellsberg action she wants. [If any player j ∈ J (i) deviates early, start Pj; if player
j ∈ J (i) deviates late, start LD.]
At the end of this phase, for all j /∈ J (i), set αj = 0 if there is at least one period
of the punishment phase where player j was not silent (completely ambiguous) and
set αj = 1 otherwise. Go to Phase SPE.
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SPE Follow q2k times the subgame perfect equilibrium θ
1(1, · · · , 1). Go to Phase P0.
LD Each player can play whatever action she wants till period (C + q1 + q2r1)k. At
period (C + q1 + q2r1)k, set α = (−1, · · · ,−1) and go to Phase EG.
EG Follow r
rp
times the subgame perfect equilibrium θp(α).
Now, I show that given any history, there is no profitable unilateral and single shot
deviation if the discount factor is high enough.
c-1) It is strictly dominant for any player j /∈ J (i) to remain silent during
a punishment phase Pi.
As players are ambiguity averse and aim to maximize their worst expected utility,
they will individually find it strictly dominant to remain silent during any punishment
phase. Indeed, if during a punishment phase (say Pi) player j /∈ J (i) is silent, she
receives at least
1. −1−δq1k
1−δ ρ during the punishment phase;
2. δq1k 1−δ
q2r1k
1−δ u
δ
j(θ
1(1, · · · , 1)) during the SPE phase;
3. some payoff Uj(δ) up to the period (C + q1 + q2r1)k;
4. an ex-ante payoff δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ u
δ
j [θ
p(1, αj)] in the Phase EG.
In total, she gets
−1− δ
q1k
1− δ ρ+ δ
q1k
1− δq2r1k
1− δ u
δ
j(θ
1(1, · · · , 1)) + Uj(δ) + δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1− δ
r
1− δ u
δ
j [θ
p(1, αj)]
If player j is not silent during the Phase Pi, she receives at most
1. 1−δ
q1k
1−δ ρ during the punishment phase;
2. δq1k 1−δ
q2r1k
1−δ u
δ
j(θ
1(1, · · · , 1)) during the SPE phase;
3. the same payoff Uj(δ) till period (C + q1 + q2r1)k;
4. an ex-ante payoff δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ
[
uδj [θ
p(1, αj)]− φ
]
in the Phase EG, see Lemma
7.
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In total, she gets
1− δq1k
1− δ ρ+ δ
q1k
1− δq2r1k
1− δ u
δ
j(θ
1(1, · · · , 1)) +Uj(δ) + δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1− δ
r
1− δ
[
uδj [θ
p(1, αj)]− φ
]
Thus, player j will find it strictly dominant to remain silent if
−21− δ
q1k
1− δ ρ+ δ
c+(q1+q2r1)k
1− δr
1− δ φ > 0 (8)
As δ goes to 1, the left hand of the latter inequality goes to −2q1kρ+rφ which is strictly
positive, see Equation (4). Therefore, there exists δ1 ∈ (δ0, 1) such that the Inequality
(8) holds for all δ ∈ (δ1, 1).
Now assume that δ ∈ (δ1, 1) so that, it is strictly dominant for any player j /∈ J (i)
to be silent on punishment phases. We wish to prove that, for sufficiently large discount
factor, σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of the finitely repeated game.
c-2) No early deviation from Phase Pi by a player j ∈ J (i) is profitable.
If after l1k + l2 rounds in the Phase Pi player j ∈ J (i) deviates, she receives:
1. at most 0 from the beginning of the Phase Pi till the deviation period;
2. an ex-ante payoff δl1k+l2+1U1j (δ) during the Phases Pj and the new SPE phase;
3. some payoff U2j (δ) till the period (C + q1 + q2r1)k;
4. an ex-ante payoff δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ u
δ
j [θ
p(α)] in the Phase EG.
If player j does not deviates, she receives at least:
1. the ex-ante payoff U1j (δ) + δ
q1k+q2r1k 1−δl1k+l2+1
1−δ u
δ
i (pi
y) till the end of the new SPE
phase;
2. the payoff U˜2i (δ) till period (C + q1 + q2r1)k;
6
3. the ex-ante payoff δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ
[
uδj [θ
p(α)]− 1
2p
]
in the Phase EG, see Lemma
7.
As yi − r2p > 0 [see Equation (5)], there exists δ2 ∈ (δ1, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ2, 1),
no early deviation from Phase Pi is profitable.
6Recall that U2i (δ) is the discounted sum of a deterministic sequence of payoffs and U˜
2
i (δ) is the
discounted sum over a permutation of the same deterministic sequence of payoffs. Therefore, as δ goes
to 1, both sums converge to the same limit.
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c-3) No early deviation from Phase P0 is profitable.
If during Phase P0, a player let’s say i deviates early, the strategy profile σ prescribes
to start the punishment phase Pi followed by the Phase SPE, to update the boolean
vector α and to go back to the Phase P0. For sufficiently high discount factor, such
a deviation is not profitable. Indeed, if player i deviates early during Phase P0, she
receives at most
1. ρ in the deviation period;
2. δ 1−δ
q1k
1−δ ui(∆S) + δ
q1k+1 1−δq2r1k
1−δ u
δ
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] in the punishment phase;7
3. some payoff U2i (δ) till the period (C + q1 + q2r1)k;
4. an ex-ante payoff δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ u
δ
j [θ
p(α)] in the Phase EG.
If player i does not deviate during the Phase P0, she receives at least
1. −1−δl
1−δ ρ till the end of the ongoing k−cycle (for some l ≤ k);
2. δl 1−δ
q1k+q2r1k−k
1−δ u
δ
i (pi
y) − δl+q1k+q2r1k−k 1−δ1+k−l
1−δ ρ corresponding to the Phase Pi and
the Phase SPE;
3. the payoff U˜2i (δ) till the period (C + q1 + q2r1)k;
8
4. the ex-ante payoff δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ u
δ
j [θ
p(αJ (i), α′−J (i))] in the Phase EG. From Lemma
7, the latter ex-ante payoff is greater than or equal to δc+(q1+q2r1)k 1−δ
r
1−δ
(
uδj [θ
p(α)]− 1
2p
)
.
Therefore, as δ goes to 1, the limit of the profit from deviating is above bounded by
2kρ+ q1kui(∆S) + q2r1ku
1,r1
i [θ
1(1, · · · , 1)] + r
2p
− (q1k + q2r1k − k)yi
which is strictly negative, see Equation (6).
Therefore, there exists δ3 ∈ (δ2, 1) such that for all δ ∈ (δ3, 1), no early deviation
from Phase P0 is profitable.
c-4) No late deviation is profitable.
If from an ongoing phase (P0 or Pi) a player let’s say j ∈ N deviates late, she receives
at most
7Recall that all players will be effective punishers.
8Note that limδ→1 U˜2i (δ) = limδ→1 U
2
i (δ).
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1. 1−δ
q1k+q2r1k
1−δ ρ till the beginning of the phase EG;
2. the ex-ante payoff δq1k+q2r1k 1−δ
r
1−δ u
δ
j [θ
p(−1, · · · ,−1)] in the Phase EG.
If player j does not deviates, she receives at least
1. −1−δq1k+q2r1k
1−δ ρ till the beginning of the phase EG;
2. the ex-ante payoff δq1k+q2r1k 1−δ
r
1−δ u
δ
j [θ
p(α)] in the Phase EG, where α ∈ {0.1}n.
From Lemma 7, the latter ex-ante payoff is strictly greater than
δq1k+q2r1k 1−δ
r
1−δ
(
uδj [θ
p(−1, · · · ,−1)] + φ).
As −2(q1k + q2r1k)ρ + rφ > 0 [see Equation (7)], there exists δ4 ∈ (δ3, 1) such that for
all δ ∈ (δ4, 1), no late deviation is profitable.
Therefore, for all δ ∈ (δ4, 1) and given any history h of the repeated game, no player
has any incentive to deviate from σ|h. That is σ is a subgame perfect equilibrium for all
C > 0. Choose C high enough and δ ∈ (δ4, 1) such that
1−δk
1−δ(C+q1+q2r1)k+r ρ+ δ
(C+q1+q2r1)k 1−δr
1−δ(C+q1+q2r1)k+r ρ < ε
For all T ≥ T and δ ∈ (δ, 1), let σT be the restriction of σ to the last T periods of the
finitely repeated game G(δ, T ). Let h be an history in the support of P (σT ). We have∥∥uδ(h)− uδ(pi)∥∥∞ < 2ε
and therefore ∥∥uδ(h)− y∥∥∞ < 3ε
for all T ≥ T and δ ≥ δ.
Part 2. (2⇒3). Assume that any point of V ∗ is approachable by means of subgame
perfect Ellsberg equilibrium of the finitely repeated game. As V ∗ is non empty, V ∗ has
non empty relative interior and statement 3) of Theorem 1 holds.
Part 3. (3⇒1). Assume that the Ellsberg decomposition of the game G is incomplete.
By induction on the time horizon, players of the block N\Nn receive their unique stage
game Ellsberg equilibrium payoff in each period of the finitely repeated game. That is,
any player of the block N\Nn has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff in the
finitely repeated game. This contradicts the statement 3) of Theorem 1.
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